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Alfredo Eric Calcagno 
and Jean-Michel 
Jakobowicz* 
This article examines some of the recent changes in 
the industrial structure at the international level. 
First, it attempts to determine the actual extent of 
relocation in order to establish whether this is an 
almost unfulfilled possibility or rather a process in 
full implementation. It goes on to describe various 
kinds of industrialization in developing countries 
and then raises the problem of the 'industrial rede-
ployment ' of the developed countries, considering 
the contradiction that exists between the current 
problem of unemployment and the probable labour 
shortage which could occur between 1985 and the 
year 2000, one solution to which could be industrial 
relocation (others would be an increase in productiv-
ity or an influx of foreign workers). The authors also 
consider the comparative advantages which may 
induce transnational corporations to establish them-
selves in developing countries, and they analyse in 
greater detail the question of wage differences as 
weighted by productivity. Finally, policy alterna-
tives are proposed for developing countries, com-
paring the characteristics and effects of 'open' in-
dustrialization based on comparative advantages 
—which would fit in with the industrial 'redeploy-
ment ' of the developed countries— with the charac-
teristics and effects of a form of industrialization 
which tends to affirm national autonomy (as for 
example in the production of capital goods) and to 
supply the majority of the population. 
*Director of the International Trade and Development 
Division of CEPAL, and Consultant on various occasions to 
the Economic Commission for Europe, respectively. 
The authors wish to thank Aníbal Pinto, Arturo Nunez 
del Prado, Luiz Claudio Marinho and Armando Di Filippo 
for their valuable comments. 
I 
The real extent of the new 
international distribution 
of industrial activity 
The concept of the international redistribution 
of industrial activity is not new, and during the 
past 20 years it has provoked many theoretical 
discussions; but it has never arisen in indus-
trialized countries in such precise and concrete 
terms as since the beginning of the 1974-1975 
crisis. In the past, the analysis has usually set 
forth a dichotomy between protectionism and 
international specialization; however, from a 
practical point of view, the situation is much 
more complex. It is not common for a country, 
no matter how powerful, to be willing to give 
up an industrial activity for the benefit of other 
countries and thus become more dependent on 
the outside for its supplies. On the other hand, 
permanent maintenance of tariff barriers to 
protect an internationally non-competitive 
industry is nota solution either. The difference 
between the interests of the transnational 
corporations and those of national States com-
plicates the question even further.1 
Before tackling the problem of the distri-
bution of industrial activity, we should deter-
mine, beyond theoretical discussions, if there 
really is a relocation of industrial production at 
the international level, and if so to what extent. 
We must first keep in mind the interaction be-
tween production and trade. For example, the 
main process of industrial relocation, which 
took the form of import substitution in many 
developing countries —in particular, in Latin 
America— meant a drastic change in the com-
position of their international trade; even if 
they increased in total value, the new imports 
fitted in with the desired process of internal 
d e v e l o p m e n t . In addition, with few excep-
t o r example, in the case of Volkswagen, which builds 
automobiles in Brazil, some of which it later exports in the 
form of separate parts to Germany, it is the German auto-
mobile industry which would be hurt in the medium term. 
It seems hard to imagine a government raising tariff 
barriers against the imports of one of its own firms. At the 
same time, however, given the labour restrictions that this 
country might have in the future, a relocation of this type 
would b e logical. 
CEPAL REVIEW No. 131 April 1981 
tions, only a part —and not the major part— of 
industrial production is exported (44% in de-
veloped countries and 23% in developing 
countries). What is now called industrial 'rede-
ployment' or 'relocation' refers to the importa-
tion from developing countries, on the part of 
some industrial countries, of certain manufac-
tures which were previously made locally, and 
to what this means for the production and 
foreign trade of the developing countries con-
cerned. 
At first sight, it seems evident that a 
growing percentage of the textiles, clothing, 
electrical appliances, etc., consumed in the 
developed countries is coming from the 'newly 
industrializing countries' (NICs);2 but in reali-
ty, at the international level, only a very small 
part of industrial production has moved from 
the North to the South (see table 1). During the 
past 15 years, only 3.3% of industrial produc-
tion moved from the developed to the devel-
oping countries:3 2.5% to the newly industrial-
izing countries and 0.8% to the other devel-
oping countries. At this rate of transfer, the ob-
jectives of the Lima Conference would be 
reached around the yearâOSO.4 
Of more particular concern now is the 
problem of the industrial production of devel-
oping countries intended for export to devel-
oped countries, the latter, for various reasons, 
having apparently decided not to be totally 
self-sufficient in these sectors. In this regard, 
there is a general impression that the devel-
oping countries have greatly increased their 
participation in the international trade in 
manufactures over the past few years. But this 
is not true. As may be seen from table 2, the 
developed countries have not only remained in 
their dominant position, they have even con-
solidated it. Thus, in 1976, 83.5% of world 
exports of manufactured products came from 
these countries, as compared with 82.6% in 
1963. Although the newly industrializing 
countries have been able to increase their par-
ticipation in the world market by 3.45%, this 
was achieved at the expense of a corresponding 
decrease in the shares of the other developing 
countries and the countries of the East.5 
Table 1 
STRUCTURE OF WORLD PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
(World total =100) 
Developed countries'1 
Developing countries 
Far Eastern NICsc' 









































Source: GATT and OECD. 
aExcluding the socialist countries. 
bComprises the OECD countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
cHong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
''Countries included in c plus Brazil and Mexico. 
2According to OECD, there are ten of these countries: 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Mexico, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. The European 
Community includes Turkey on this list. See OECD, 
L'incidence des nouveaux pays industriels, Paris, 1979; 
and Commission of the European Communities, Evolution 
des structures sectorielles des économies européennes 
depuis la crise du pétrole, 1973-1978. 
3United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion, World Industry since 1960: Progress and Prospects, 
New York, 1979. 
4The UNIDO Conference held in March 1975 in Lima 
fixed the objective that at least 25% of the production of 
manufactured goods should be carried out in developing 
countries by the year 2000. This percentage was 6.9% in 
1960 and 8.6% in 1976. 
5Ofthe newly industrializing countries, those of south-
east Asia had the most intense growth in their foreign trade: 
if we contrast this fact with the world production structure 
described above, we may conclude that the increase in the 
production of these newly industrializing countries of the 
Far East was largely absorbed by their foreign trade, while 
in Brazil and Mexico this extra production was directed 
towards their internal market. 
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Table 2 
IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES BY THE 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, CLASSIFIED 
BY REGION OF ORIGIN 




Far Eastern NIC^ 
Far Eastern NICs plus 
Latin America0 
Socialist countries 
Imports of manu factures 




















Source: GATT and OECD. 
aOECD countries plus Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
bHong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
^Countries included in b plus Brazil and Mexico. 
As shown in table 2, almost all imports of 
manufactured products by the developed coun-
tries, in both 1963 and 1978, came from other 
developed countries; only 5.8% came from the 
newly industrializing countries and 4.0% from 
the rest of the developing countries and the 
Eastern bloc. Moreover, one of the patterns 
of sub-development continues to appear: al-
though the newly industrializing countries 
markedly increased their exports of manufac-
tures to the developed countries, the latter 
export more to the newly industrializing coun-
tries than they import from there. In 1977 the 
balance was 18.2 billion dollars in favour of the 
OECD countries; Japan had a positive balance 
of 10.6 billion dollars, and only the United 
States showed a deficit {2.6 billion). 
The only areas in which the newly indus-
trializing countries have been successful in 
their search for a market in the developed coun-
tries are clothing and footwear, textiles and 
electrical appliances. This group of products, 
however, represents only 4.5% of the total im-
ports of OECD countries and barely 2% of their 
total consumption of manufactured goods6 (see 
table 3). 
6Speech given at the meeting of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development by Robert S. 
The context of capital and skilled labour in 
products is a determining factor in these ex-
changes. Thus, 56% of the goods imported from 
the newly industrializing countries by the ad-
vanced industrialized countries have a very 
small content of skilled labour, and 68% have a 
very small, and sometimes negligible content 
of capital, whereas half of the goods exchanged 
among industrialized countries have a very 
high capital content (see table A of the 
appendix). 
In turn, studies of the consumption behav-
iour of families in developed countries (see 
table 4), reflect relative saturation with respect 
to certain basic necessities. The demand for 
clothing and footwear, food products, furniture, 
and more recently household appliances, has 
grown much less rapidly than total consump-
tion, the most active sectors of which have been 
health, leisure activities, housing and trans-
port.7 If these products (except household ap-
pliances) are considered from the point of view 
of their manufacture, they are seen to be indus-
trial products which require little capital (in the 
case of clothing and footwear, 63.5% less than 
the average for manufacturing industries) and 
unskilled labour, and in which there have been 
practically no innovations of any importance in 
recent years. 
To sump up, then, the vast majority of in-
dustries transferred8 to developing countries 
have low capital and research content, use 
technology 'behind' that of the developed 
countries, and have a high content of unskilled 
labour. These industries have either a stagnant 
or sluggishly growing market in the developed 
MeNamara, President of the World Bank, Manila, 10 may 
1979. 
7See France, Commissariat Général du Plan, La 
spécialisation internationale des industries à l'horizon 
1985, París, 1978. 
8The term 'transfer' may give rise to some misunder-
standing. The headquarters of a corporation does not neces-
sarily open a branch in a developing country —as often 
occurred in the process of import substitution— or transfer 
the whole firm, but rather the government of the developed 
country adopts internal political measures, such as termina-
tion of subsidies or lowering of tariffs, with the result that 
resort is had to imports rather than domestic production or 
that a transnational corporation reorganizes its production 
chain by subcontracting labour-intensive stages to devel-
oping countries. 
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Table 3 
PERCENTAGE OF OECD IMPORTS COMING FROM NICs, BY PRODUCTS, 
1963 AND 1977 
SITC division 
Clothing (84) 
Leather and footwear 
(61,83,85) 
















































Source: OECD, L'incidence..., op. cit., p. 27. 
ilNICs: Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. 
bSITC divisions 62,69,66,67,73,71,5,64. 
Table 4 
EUROPE: CHANGES IN PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, BY 
FUNCTION, AT 1970 PRICES 
(1970 = 100) 
Food 
Clothing 















































Source: National accounts of the OECD countries, 1960-1977, Vol. II, Paris, 
1979. 
countries, with prices increasing less than-
those of other products. This article deals with 
this type of ' redeployment ' , which constitutes 
only a minor part of the changes occurring in 
industrial location in the world, the most im-
portant part, as already noted, being made up of 
the new industries intended to supply internal 
markets. The article will go on to discuss how 
this fits in with the industrial development con-
sidered desirable for the developing countries 
and the reasons which could motivate the de-
veloped countries to import these products 
from the developing countries in the future. 
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II 
Types of industrialization in developing countries 
Faced with this panorama of concentration in 
the central countries, the peripheral countries 
in general, and the Latin American countries in 
particular, must takle the problems of how to 
develop their economies, especially their in-
dustry. In this respect, such questions arise as: 
What type of industrial structure should Latin 
American countries seek? What should be the 
interrelationship between the domestic market 
and exportation? How much leeway is allowed 
by the developed countries' policies, and how 
could most advantage be taken of the margin for 
manoeuvring which exists? 
(a) Different types of industrialization 
To answer the first question we must first 
of all characterize the different types of indus-
trialization which the developing countries 
could adopt. 
Historically, Adam Smith considered in-
dustry as a complex of manufacturing and pro-
ductive activities, giving it an institutional 
meaning extending beyond the connotation of 
ability, perseverance and diligence which it 
has when used in respect of persons.9 In other 
words, "industry means the relationship be-
tween man and nature, through work effected 
by means of a machine".10 In fact, he is de-
scribing the British industrialization system, 
because in it there was a simultaneous reor-
ganization of* agriculture and increase in agri-
cultural productivity which enabled agricul-
tural labour to emigrate to the cities; a first 
phase of consumer goods industries, especially 
textiles; and a subsequent iron and steel phase 
accompanied by an intense supply of capital on 
the domestic and international markets.11 In 
the Soviet system, for its part, a rapid process 
of industrialization coincided with the collec-
t é e Ruggiero Romano, Industria: storia e problemi, 
Turin, Giulio Einaudi, Editore, 1976. 
mbid., p. 3. 
nibid.,p.31. 
tivization for agriculture and was essentially 
oriented towards capital goods.12 
Later, many different processes of indus-
trialization developed which adopted to a 
greater or lesser extent the elements of these 
two models. Table 5 summarizes various types 
of industrialization, showing the degree to 
which they are autonomous or dependent, 
popular or elitist. It is a basic outline which 
only proposes to show the great variety of pos-
sible processes of industrialization. The cate-
gories of analysis refer to the type of goods 
produced (capital, intermediate or consumer); 
for whom (internal market or export; high or 
low income groups); how (simple or complex 
technology, integrated into the national econ-
omy or transnational corporations, high or low 
value retained in the producing country); and 
by whom (high or low wages, with or without 
union rights, State enterprises or national or 
foreign private industries). 
From this typology, basic differences can 
be seen among the various types of indus-
trialization. A glance at the extreme cases 
shows that there is very little in common, on the 
one hand, between an autonomous form of in-
dustrialization, which manufactures capital 
goods for the internal market, is integrated into 
the national economy, retains a high value in 
the developing country, pays high salaries and 
is carried out by domestic or State firms, and, on 
the other hand, a form of industrialization 
which manufactures consumer goods for ex-
port, uses complex technology, is integrated 
into a transnational corporation, retains little 
value in the underdeveloped country, pays low 
wages and is carried out by a transnational 
corporation. 
In considering 'types of industrialization' 
it should be kept in mind that in countries with 
a mixed economy, like those in Latin America, 
various combinations of 'types of industrial-
i sée Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of 
Capitalism, London, 1946. 
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Table 5 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS 
TYPES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION* 





Domest ic market 
Export 






Degree of integration 
Integration into national economy 
Integrated with transnational 
corporations 




High wages and union rights 
Low wages without union rights 
















































































*Weightings (X, XX and XXX) signify zero or little, medium or high importance. 
ization' coexist in different branches and firms. 
What is important is what prevails in the eco-
nomic situation as a whole. Thus, our prefer-
ence for an autonomous and popular industrial-
ization is obvious, for reasons of political phi-
losophy which go beyond the microeconomic 
perspect ive (which also has no reason to dis-
favour this option). 
(b) The internal market and exportation 
The controversy contrasting import sub-
stitution industrialization with the export of 
manufactures appeared to have been settled 20 
years ago; however, since it has arisen again, it 
seems advisable to recall the basic arguments 
in favour of the preponderance of the domestic 
market and the complementary and supportive 
role of exports manufactures. In a recent analy-
sis13 it was shown that "the histórico-structural 
form of Latin America, at present and in the 
foreseeable future, means that its development 
13See Aníbal Pinto, Centro-periferia e industrializa-
ción (mimeographed), Santiago, Chile, december 1980. 
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depends primarily on the use of its human and 
material resources in activities oriented to-
wards the internal market. The present coef-
ficients of openness and the future prospects 
bear clear witness to show this reality". The 
same study indicates the important supportive 
role of manufactured exports in acquiring for-
eign currency and in complementing the in-
ternal demand with the exterior, thus, in 
certain cases permitting suitable levels of 
productivity and costs to be reached. In sum, 
this is not an exclusive alternative but rather a 
complementary one in which the main function 
is production for the domestic market. 
(c) External insertion 
The third question asked at the beginning 
of this section referred to the leeway left by the 
industrial policy of the developed countries 
and the opportunities for developing countries 
to take advantage of it. This subject is related 
to 'industrial redeployment' and will be dis-
cussed in the following section. 
I l l 
The 'industrial redeployment' of the developed countries 
This chapter considers the situation of the de-
veloped countries and the motives they may 
have to adopt a policy of 'industrial redeploy-
ment'. The first question considered is the 
labour force, and the short-term problem of un-
employment is clearly distinguished from the 
medium- and long-term problems related to the 
decrease in the active population due to the 
decline in the birth rate. The second aspect is 
that of the possible comparative advantages of 
the developing countries, especially the wage 
differential, endowment of natural resources, 
saving of energy, absence of anti-pollution ex-
penses and fiscal advantages. 
1. Unemployment, the active population 
and industrial 'redeployment' 
One of the most important problems facing the 
industrialized countries since 1975 has to do 
with the direct and indirect effects of a relative 
decrease in the population in general (see table 
6) and of the active population in particular. 
This phenomenon manifests itself already at 
the demand level (closing of primary schools 
for lack of pupils, for example), but it appears 
completely unrealistic if it is looked at from the 
point of view of the supply of labour, since it is 
well known that in 1980 there were more than 
6 930 000 persons seeking employment in the 
European Community and more than 6 000 000 
in the United States. However, the statement 
that the economic growth of the industrialized 
countries could be slowed down by a lack of 
labour is based on two facts: on the one hand, 
the decrease in the active population during 
the second half of the 1980s, and on the other, 
the decrease in productivity of the labour force. 
It is thus necessary to draw a clear dis-
tinction between the short-term effects of 
relocation on employment and its possible rela-
Table 6 
DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION, 
1950, 1975 AND 2000 





















































Source: United Nations, World Population Trends and 
Policies, 1977, Monitoring Report, New York, 
1979. 
14 CEPAL REVIEW No. 13/Apri/1981 
tionship with the decrease in the active popu-
lation in the long term. 
(a) The short term: employment 
In the short term, the main argument used 
by the developed countries against industrial 
redeployment is the decrease in jobs it would 
cause. In the face of this situation, the reaction 
of governments has been a defensive one and 
has taken the form of subsidies or protection-
ism, usually at the request of trade unions 
and regional pressure groups. However, many 
studies show that although there may be un-
employment at the level of the companies af-
fected, the effects on global, regional or sec-
toral employment are minimal; furthermore, in 
the medium term the developed countries may 
acquire additional markets in the countries 
which are industrializing, since the reciprocal 
exchanges and exports thus generated will 
create jobs. 
In France, employment losses due to im-
ports from developing countries affected 73 400 
persons in 1970 and 93 200 in 1976, that is, on 
the average less than 0.4% of the active popula-
tion.14 Between 1976 and 1985 these imports 
could cause 153 000 to 343 000 persons (be-
tween 2.8% and 6.3% of the labour force em-
ployed in industry) to lose their jobs, depend-
ing on whether there is 'limited protection' of 
the French economy or 'increased competi-
tion'. These figures, however, only show one 
aspect of the process, for if the employment 
which is linked to exports to developing coun-
tries is taken into account, the tally is either 
markedly positive or at least relatively well 
balanced for the future, depending on the sce-
narios adopted. This balance between losses 
and gains in employment due to exports from 
newly industrializing countries has been stud-
ied a great deal.15 In the Federal Republic of 
1 4France, Commissariat General du Plan, Le défi 
économique du tiers-monde, report of the working group 
headed by Ives Berthelot and Gerard Tardy, Paris, La 
documentation française, 1978. 
I5Abstracts of these studies may be found in OECD, 
L'incidence..., op. cit., annex 2; and in International Labour 
Organisation, Restructuring of Industrial Economies and 
Trade with Developing Countries, by Santrah Mukherjee 
and Charlotte Feller, Geneva, 1978. 
Germany, "100 million marks' worth of im-
ported manufactured products from develop-
ing countries would cause approximately 2 250 
workers to be laid off. But on the other hand, 
the export of an equal value of manufactured 
products from Germany to the developing 
countries would create approximately 2 160 
jobs".16'17 Thus, the net effect on employment 
of a balanced increase in trade between 
Germany and developing countries would be 
practically nil; the only change would be in the 
structure of employment: some of the workers 
affected by the growth of imports from de-
veloping countries would have to change 
branches of industry to meet the demand for 
exports. 
In Great Britain, the annual decrease in 
available jobs between 1970 and 1975 was 6.1% 
in textile yarns, 4.5% in the footwear and cotton 
industries and 2.4% in clothing. After an analy-
sis of the causes of the job losses, the conclu-
sion was reached that only a very small part 
of them was due to imports from developing 
countries: 0.05% for textile yarns, 0.4% 
for footwear, 0.8% for cotton and 1.07% for 
clothing.18 
In the United States, for industry as a 
whole —except the textile industry, which has 
non-tariff barriers— the impact on employment 
of a 50% overall reduction in existing customs 
duties, distributed over ten years, would cause 
the loss of only 15 000 jobs. The elimination of 
non-tariff barriers would mean an increase in 
agricultural exports of 320 million dollars and 
an increase in net imports of textile products of 
965 million dollars. This would lead to the 
creation of 1 000 jobs in agriculture and the loss 
of 88 000 in the textile sector.19 
! 6 Deutsches Institut íür Wirtschaftsforschung, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, vol. 14, No. 5, Berlin, 1977. Cited in ILO, 
Restructuring..., op. cit. 
1 7 D. Schumacher, "Beschâftigungwirkungen von 
Importen aus Entwicklungslandem nicht dramatisieren", 
DIW Wochenbericht, No. 1, January 1978, cited in OECD, 
L'incidence..., op. cit. 
18Overseas Development Institute, ODI Review, 
London, No. 2,1977. 
i a
"Not only are aggregate effects of a significant tariff-
cutting exercise small, but the effects on individual indus-
tries, on various occupational groups, and on employment 
in different states are minimal in most cases.... normal in-
dustry growth can handle any adverse employment impact, 
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In the OECD countries, a reduction of 50% 
in the customs duties of all countries for all 
products —except agricultural, textile and 
petroleum products— would at worst bring 
about a decrease of 0.9% in the supply of jobs 
and at best an increase of 1.22%.20 
This information indicates that the effects 
of industrial relocation on employment in de-
veloped countries are very slight or insignif-
icant in the medium term, while in the long 
term, this relocation, which has been discussed 
at such length at the national and international 
levels, could become a necessity. 
(b) The long term: the active population 
Most persons who will be of working age in 
the year 2000 were born before 1980; it is thus 
possible to determine their number almost 
exactly. If we consider the growth in the 
European population, for example, we see that 
this growth reached its high point during the 
years 1960 to 1965 (leaving aside the post-war 
'baby-boom' (see table 6); the young people 
born during this period began to reach the 
labour market in 1978, and the last effects of 
this substantial growth in the birth rate will be 
felt around 1985. 
On the other hand, since 1965 the growth 
in the population has been increasingly slow, 
sinking almost to zero in recent years. In the 
Federal Republic of Germany the population 
decreased by 1.2% in absolute figures between 
1974 and 1978. This implies that from 1975 
until at least the year 2000, the active popula-
tion will decrease in European countries and in 
North America. On the contrary, the devel-
in all but 20 industries... Employment changes both by skill 
group and by state are insignificant, especially if the cuts 
are staged over a ten-year period." (See R.E. Baldwin, 
"Trade and Employment Effects in the United States of 
Multilateral Tariff Reductions", in American Economic 
Review, May 1976. Cited in ILO, Restructuring..., op. cit., 
p . 24.) 
2 0According to the study made by A.B. Deardoff, R.M. 
Stern and C F . Baum, "A Multi-country Simulation of the 
Employment and Exchange-rate Effects of Post Kennedy 
Round Tariff Reduction", in N. Akrasanee, S. Naya and V. 
Vichit-Vadakan (eds.), Trade and Employment in Asia and 
the Pacific, Honolulu, The University of Hawaii Press, 
1977. Cited in O E C D , L'incidence.... op. cit. 
oping countries have rates of population 
growth which are 2.8% higher than those of the 
industrialized countries; although it is true that 
the gross birth rate decreased by 13.5% be-
tween 1960 and 1980, the mortality rate went 
down by 45% in the same period, which ex-
plains why the population in this area has 
doubled in 30 years. It now represents 72% of 
the world's population and will reach more 
than 78% in the year 2000 (see table 7). To sum 
up, on the one hand we have today's indus-
trialized countries, with a population which is 
growing at a very low rate or even decreasing, 
and with the same situation about to occur in 
the labour force after 1985; on the other hand, 
we have the developing countries, with a popu-
lation which is growing increasingly rapidly, 
and with a very large unemployed labour force. 
If the industrialized countries want to increase 
their standard of living at the same rate as from 
1950 to 1980, they have three possibilities: to 
increase the productivity of their labour force 
(produce more with relatively less labour), to 
import foreign labour, or to subcontract part of 
their production. 
Table 7 
GROWTH OF WORLD POPULATION 1950-1975 
AND 1975-2000 

























Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1979. 
The first solution, to increase labour pro-
ductivity, seems to be losing impetus today, for 
since the beginning of the 1970s and more 
specifically during recent years, productivity 
has tended to grow less rapidly than in the past, 
and even to decrease in some countries (see 
table 8). This problem, which is being closely 
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Table 8 
GROWTH OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN 
S E L E C T E D DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(1957-1973 AND 1973-1978) 




























Source: OKCT), Annuaires statistiques, Paris, 1957-1978; 
ILO, Annuaires statistiques, Geneva, 1957-1978. 
a
 1973-1977. 
studied, particularly in the United States, has 
up to now proved insoluble. A priori it can 
easily be seen that there are factors such as 
investment in machinery, degree of skill of the 
labour force and technological discoveries 
which have an impact on the growth of produc-
tivity; but it is difficult to measure exactly what 
their impact is. Attempts to estimate this have 
been made without much success, and much of 
this phenomenon remains unexplained. 
There is a mathematical function linking 
economic growth, growth of productivity and 
growth of the active and employed popu-
lation.21 This function determines what the 
growth in productivity from now until the year 
2000 should be in order to maintain an eco-
nomic growth rate similar to that of the past, 
taking into account labour restrictions. The 
answer is that for the majority of industrialized 
countries the rate of growth of labour produc-
tivity would have to be 50 to 200% higher in the 
next 20 years than at present, if these countries 
want to achieve the same economic growth as 
from 1957 to 1973 (see table 9). In the present 
context, these increases seem very improbable, 
since most technological and financial efforts 
in the next few years will be devoted to per-
fecting procedures for production and conser-
vation of energy to replace oil, which is increas-
ingly expensive and relatively scarce. These 
procedures will not be directly related to the 
production of an additional good, but rather to 
the gradual replacement of a good that already 
exists, and they will thus have only a very small 
impact on the overall growth of productivity. 
Since it seems very improbable that pro-
ductivity can be substantially increased,22 
there remains the possibility of incorporating 
foreign labour, as happened after the Second 
World War and particularly since the end of the 
1960s in Western Europe. 
If we start from the empirical relationship 
between the increase in productivity and 
economic grpwth, we can determine the labour 
needed at every level of economic growth, and 
the maximum rate of growth in relation to the 
available labour in the year 200023 (see 
table 10). 
21This relationship may be explained in the following 
way; 
E P o = AP0(l-URo) 
PR0 = VA0/EP0 
VA VAU+x)* 
EP=-
— - i t PR PR0(l=pr) 
= AP(l-UR)=AP0fl+ap) t(l-UR) 
EPoxi l+ap) 1 
(1-UR) VAr (1+x) 
d-UR( 




whereEP = Employed Population 
AP = Active Population 
UR = Unemployment Rate 
PR = Labour Productivity 
VA = Value Added 
x = Annual growth rate of value added, and 
pr and ap are the annual growth rates of pro-
ductivity and the active population. 
22SetabIe8. 
23The simple least squares method gives the following 
results for the period 1958-1978: 
United States: pr = 0.50x R2 = 0.65 D.W. = 2.65 
(7.14) (value of T) 
France: pr = 0.83x R2 = 0.89 D.W. = 1.60 
Germany: pr = 0.88x R2 = 0.62 D.W. = 0.82 
(15.2) 
Great Britain: pr = 0.89x R2 = 0.87 D.W. = 1.89 
(13.4) 
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Table 9 





































Source: Calculated on the basis of United Nations, World Population Trends, op. cit., New York, 
1979; World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Washington, August 1979, and 
sources of table 8. 
Table 10 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (XX) AND FOREIGN POPULATION REQUIRED (X) IN 
PROPORTION TO ACTIVE POPULATION ACCORDING TO ECONOMIC 

































Source: Same as table 9. 
Thus, France will have to maintain a strong rate 
of growth in order to ensure, if not full employ-
ment, at least a limited rate of unemployment 
The United States, on the contrary, will be 
unable to ensure a growth of rate of 2.4%' 
/here: pr 
x 
= rate of growth of productivity 
= rate of growth of gross national 
product. 
This relationship between the growth of productivity 
and the growth of production - or "Verdoom's Law" has 
been studied since the 1940s. See Solomon Fabricant, 
Employment in Manufacturing, 1889 to 1939, NBER, 
1942; and P.J. Verdoorn, "Fattori che règulono lo svíluppo 
della produttívitá del lavoro" in L'Industria, 1949. 
without resorting to foreign labour. The situa-
tion of the Federal Republic of Germany is, 
from this point of view, serious: if the growth of 
productivity continues to be related to econom-
ic growth in the same way as during the past 
20 years, it will be necessary to accept from 1.7 
to 3.0 million foreign workers to maintain pro-
duction growth rates of 2 to 4% annually. If we 
take into account the fact that there are current-
ly already 4 million foreigners in Germany, of 
whom 1.8 million are workers (i.e., 100 active 
workers to 115 inactive persons), this country 
would have between 7.6 and 10.3 million for-
eigners in the year 2000, that is to say, between 
12% and 16% of its population compared with 
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6.5% in 1978.24 Only Great Britain appears to be 
able to maintain its 1960s' growth rate without 
any great structural change.25 
T h e question thus arises as to whether it is 
advisable for a developed country to receive a 
foreign population which represents 12% to 
16% of its own population. The difficulties met 
by the immigrant workers, particularly in 
France , where in 1975 they only represented 
6.5% of the French population, may raise some 
doubts in this respect; however, in the absence 
of such legislation as that of Switzerland, it may 
b e very difficult in a crisis to dismiss these 
potentially unemployed workers and send 
them back to their countries of origin. In the 
future it is quite probable that governments 
may wish to avoid the unfortunate experience 
of subsidies for going back to the country of 
origin, such as those given in France; the 
alternative then, will be to produce less (see 
table 11) or to concentrate more on the pro-
duction of capital-intensive goods and technol-
ogy and more labour-intensive production to 
developing countries. 
2. The comparative advantages of industrial 
relocation for the developed countries 
It is not our intention to debate the theoretical 
Table 11 
POTENTIAL ECONOMIC GROWTH/ 1980-2000 















Source: Same as table 8. 
aUsing labour elasticity in relation to the gross national 
product and data on the active population (see footnotes 21 
and 23). 
24The data concerning foreign population were extrac-
ted from Eurostast, Emploi et chômage 1972-1978, Luxem-
bourg, July 1979. 
25This entire argument presupposes stability of the 
relationship between growth of productivity and growth of 
the economy. 
problem of comparative advantages or their 
general application to the distribution of in-
vestment between the centre and periphery of 
the world economy. We will discuss only the 
concrete case of the most obvious advantages of 
location in the periphery for enterprises of the 
central countries. We are particularly inter-
ested in elucidating the problem of how much 
the difference in wages between developing 
and developed countries is counterbalanced by 
the differences in productivity. We are not 
discussing the problem of 'comparative disad-
vantages' , because we would have to analyse 
them at the microeconomic level, case by case; 
we could not generalize about the existence or 
non-existence of infrastructure, skilled labour, 
basic services, communications, transport, 
education and health services and the rest of 
the external economies, or the political risks 
involved. Up to now, these latter considera-
tions have prevailed; but it is probable that the 
importance of the 'advantages' will increase in 
the future. 
(a) Wages 
A priori, the difference between the wages 
paid to workers in developing countries and 
those in developed countries is one of the most 
comparative advantages for transnational com-
panies . These firms usually justify the low 
wages paid in developing countries by citing 
the low labour productivity in these countries. 
Thus , according to them, each unit produced 
contains the same wage proportion in the two 
regions. It is precisely this theoretical problem, 
which has long been a part of the rhetoric re-
garding redeployment, which we are going to 
study from the quantitative point of view in the 
following paragraphs. 
The essential point is to establish a relation-
ship between labour productivities, both at the 
national level (between activity sectors) and at 
t he international level. If labour productivity is 
expressed in homogeneous physical units of 
production per worker (see table B of the ap-
pendix), it is possible to compare it between 
countries. In most cases, however, the same 
sector produces a heterogeneous group of 
goods, which makes it very difficult to estimate 
an internationally comparable rate of produc-
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tivity. At the same time, it is impossible to de-
termine the proportion of wages per physical 
unit produced. 
There are various ways this question can 
be approached. Below, we will summarize four 
of them and use them to estimate the relative 
share of wages among sectors and at the inter-
national level. In order to do this, a sample was 
taken consisting of 18 countries,26 4 industries 
and the manufactured products sector as a 
whole in 1973.27 Special consideration will be 
given to the cases of transnational corporations 
located in developed and developing countries. 
(i) Nominal wages 
Analysis of the data shows that there is a 
wide gap between the average nominal wages 
paid to industrial employees and workers in 
developed and developing countries (see table 
12). In the latter group of countries, the average 
wages do not exceed 10% of those paid in the 
United States, while in turn, European wages 
are 20% lower than United States wages. In 
1980, the evolution of wages and exchange 
rates tended to emphasize even more the dif-
ference between developed and developing 
countries, since European and United States 
wages have practically become equal. 
This comparison seeks only to determine 
the wage costs for the transnational corpora-
tion, and thus the money equivalents are calcu-
lated according to the exchange rate. If the pur-
pose were to compare the standard of living of 
the wage earners, we would have used a parity 
exchange rate based on the prices of a basket of 
goods. 
A comparison of the average wages within 
each sector shows the same tendency in the 
different groups of countries: in the manufac-
turing sector, workers in the textile industry are 
the most poorly paid, while the best wages are 
those earned in the mineral and metal indus-
2 6 The developing countries are India, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Mozambique, South Korea, 
Colombia, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore, while the developed countries are Japan, Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United 
States. 
2 7 The industries are; textiles (ISIC 321), iron and steel 
(ISIC 371), non-ferrous metals (ISIC 372), metals (ISIC 
381), and the manufacturing sector (ISIC 3). 
tries. However —as another consequence of 
structural heterogeneity— the difference be-
tween the highest and lowest wages is greater 
in the developing countries (80%) than in the 
developed countries (50%, excluding Japan) 
(see table C of the appendix). 
Wages in the textile industry are closer to 
the average wage in the developing countries 
than in the developed countries, due to the 
relative importance of this sector in the first 
group of countries. In the developing coun-
tries, only 3.9% of the employed active popu-
lation works in the manufacturing sector 
—compared with 20% in the developed coun-
tries— and within this 3.9%, 21% is in the 
textile industry, compared with 6% to 7% in the 
developed countries (see table D of the ap-
pendix). 
(ii) Wages weighted by productivity, 
by industrial sectors 
If productivity is measured by the quantity 
of homogeneous goods produced by each 
employee and worker —in the iron and steel 
industry, for example— then to produce 1 000 
tons of steel, 3.5 man-years would be needed in 
the United States, 9.2 in Great Britain and 15.7 
in Brazil.28 If wages in Brazil are one-tenth of 
those in the United States, however, the cost of 
labour contained in each ton of steel will be 2.2 
times greater in the United States than in 
Brazil. 
Another way of approaching the problem 
consists of analysing the labour cost per unit of 
value added. This relationship, which also 
represents the distribution of value added 
between remuneration of capital and labour, is 
on average twice as much in the developed 
countries as in the other countries, with Japan 
coming somewhere between the two extremes 
(see table E of the appendix). 
Another method used to estimate interna-
2 8 This difference between productivities is not only 
due to the skill of the labour force: amoYig other causes may 
be mentioned (i) the age of the machines; (ii) the techno-
logical level; (iii) sub-contracting: in the United States, for 
example, many jobs are done by outside enterprises and are 
thus counted as services, while in the developing countries 
these same jobs are done by employees of the steel works. 
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Table 12 
AVERAGE WAGE PER PERSON EMPLOYED 
(United States = 100) 
Textiles Iron Non- Metal- Manu-
and ferrous lurgy factures 
steel metals 
Developing countries* 10.0 9.1 11.2 10.2 8.0 
Developed countries" 78.2 76.2 80.1 78.6 79.0 
Developed countries 
except Japan 94.4 83.6 90.5 90.9 91.5 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1975, New York, 1977; International 
Labour Organisation, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1977, Geneva, 1978; United Nations, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, New York. 
«These countries are listed in footnote 26. 
tional productivity by industrial sector is to 
deflate the value of the goods produced, using a 
price index, in order to obtain comparable 
amounts. The amounts thus obtained, divided 
by the number of employees and workers, yield 
a new measure of productivity.29 Table F of the 
appendix shows the results obtained using a 
'basket of goods' as a price deflator.30 To 
increase the precision of such estimates, it 
would be necessary to use a deflator for each 
sector and not one with a single price per 
country. The results obtained by this method 
show that the wages paid by firms in the de-
veloping countries are from 10% to 25% of 
those paid in the United States for the same 
quantity of goods produced. 
The last estimation method we will men-
tion is based on a study by the International 
Labour Organisation,31 which links the level of 
2 9
 Productivity Pij of sector i for country j may be ex-
pressed thus: 
Oij where Oij is the value of production, Pj is 
Pij = the price deflator and Eij the number of 
Pj x Eij employees in sector i of country j . 
T h e expenditure on wages per unit produced would be: 
Sij Sij x Pj where Sij represents the 
SEi j= = wages paid in sector i. 
Eij x Pij Pij 
3 uSee I. B. Kravis, Z. Kennessey and others, A System 
of International Comparison of Gross Product and Pur-
chasing Power, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
3*See M.F. Lydall, Commerce et emploi, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1976. 
development and productivity. A series of 
regressions based on a group of 18 countries 
allows us to determine the elasticity of this 
productivity in relation to the per capita gross 
national product. This elasticity reflects the 
effect on the productivity of the industry con-
cerned of a one-unit increase in the productivi-
ty of the whole economy. According to the re-
sults, the most productive sectors are iron and 
steel and non-ferrous metals, while the least 
productive is the textile industry. The labour 
cost per unit of value added is from 45% to 70% 
lower in the developing countries (see tables G 
and H of the appendix). 
The results obtained are summarized in 
tables 13 and 14 and show that the differences 
in wages continue to be substantial even when 
they -are weighted by productivity. 
(iii) Wages in branches of transnational 
corporations 
The calculations made above concern the 
whole of given productive sectors; but in the 
particular type of enterprise represented by the 
branches of transnational firms in the devel-
oping countries the productivity of workers is 
usually not much below that of the parent firms 
in the developed countries. 
Two facts confirm this supposition: first, 
the transnational corporations use technology 
in the developing country which is not very far 
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Cuadro 13 
SUMMARY OF NOMINAL WAGES AND UNIT COSTS OF PRODUCTION 







































Source: Same as table 12. 
"Only for steel. 
bBrazil. 
Table 14 
D E V E L O P I N G COUNTRIES: SUMMARY OF DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS O F 
NOMINAL WAGES AND UNIT COSTS OF PRODUCTION, BY BRANCHES 
OF INDUSTRY 
(United States = 100) 
Iron and Non-ferrous Metal- Total 
Textiles steel metals lurgy manufac-
tures 
Share of wages in 
value added 
Average nominal wage 
Wage weighted by 
productivity 
Price deflator method 
Degree of development 
method 























Source: Same as table 12. 
aBrazil. 
behind that of the developed country; second, 
this technology is usually quite standardized 
and automated, which means that the differ-
ences in labour skills between one country and 
another do not have a significant repercussion 
on labour productivity. 
Various studies of concrete cases confirm 
this general evaluation. The United States 
Tariff Commission, in its report to the Presi-
dent in September 1970,32 notes that the 
productivity of workers in foreign branches of 
United States corporations engaged in the as-
sembly or processing of products originating in 
the United States "is generally similar to that of 
32See U.S. Tariff Commission, Economic Factors Af-
fecting the Use of Items 807.00 amd 806.30 of the Tariff 
Schedules of the U.S., Washington, September 1970, 
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workers doing the same jobs in the United 
States". Donald W. Baerresen arrives at similar 
conclusions in his analysis of the border indus-
trialization programme in Mexico; he states 
that, in certain cases —electronics and cloth-
ing, for example— the productivity of work-
ers in Mexico is actually higher than that of 
workers in the United States engaged on simi-
lar operations.33 Otto Kreye, in his study on 
world-market-oriented industrialization of de-
veloping countries and free production zones,34 
shows that the productivity per worker in the 
textile, electronics and clothing factories in 
Malaysia is analogous to that of the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Y.S. Chang, in his study of the semiconductor 
industry,35 states that after a learning period the 
productivity on the assembly lines in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore is 
greater than that prevailing in the United 
States. This is due, among other things, to the 
fact that in the United States the workers who 
accept these jobs are unskilled, marginal work 
ers who change jobs frequently. Referring to 
another type of industry, Celso Furtado states 
that the physical productivity of labour in the 
production of Mercedes Benz trucks in Brazil is 
10% higher than in Germany.36 
(b) Other comparative advantages 
The low wages in the developing countries 
are only one of the advantages that transnation-
al corporations can get from relocating their 
production. Lower costs of production due to a 
greater supply of natural resources; energy 
savings in the cases of industries which con-
sume a high proportion of energy; absence of 
antipollution regulations, and fiscal advantages 
are major additional reasons for moving to de-
33See Donald W. Baerresen, The Border Industrial-
ization Program of Mexico, Lexington Books, Mass., 1971. 
34See Otto Kreye, World Market Oriented Industrial-
ization of Developing Countries: Free Production Zones 
and World Market Factories, Max Planck Institute, Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1977 (mimeographed). 
35See Y.S. Chang, The Transfer of Technology: 
Economics of Offshore Assembly. The Case of the Semi-
conductor Industry, UNITAR, research report Ño. 11, New 
York, 1971. 
36See Celso Furtado, Revue Tiers Monde, Paris, April-
June 1978. 
veloping countries. In addition, these corpora-
tions usually dominate the markets easily and 
thus ensure the long-term success of their 
business. 
The ample supply of natural resources may 
mean lower costs of production. It will obvious-
ly be cheaper to exploit an 'open pit' mine than 
to extract from a deep one; for example, in two 
concrete cases of iron ore exploitation, the cost 
per ton of unrefined mineral delivered by rail 
from an underground mine was 3.3 times 
greater than that of ore from a strip mine.37 
Similarly, agricultural exploitation in rich soil 
which dispenses with the need for fertilizers 
and artificial irrigation, will be significantly 
cheaper than another case where these ele-
ments are needed; in the case of beef, the 
prices to the producer in dollars per kg of live 
weight were in 1976, as an annual average, 0.34 
in Argentina, 0.62 in Australia and 0.75 in the 
United.States; while at the other end of the 
scale they were 1.35 in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1.49 in France and 1.61 in Japan.38 
The possibility of saving energy is another 
comparative advantage that may motivate some 
industries to relocate. Since the oil crisis, the 
developed countries have attempted to manage 
their own resources carefully and avoid over-
loading their balance of payments with un-
necessary oil imports. As a result, in response to 
this situation, some industries which consume 
large amounts of energy might move to devel-
oping countries with abundant energy resour-
ces. Thus, the production of gas linked to the 
extraction of oil could be used advantageously 
in local industrial facilities such as metallurgy, 
iron and steel and chemicals which have high 
energy requirements. Agreements of this sort 
may be made which would benefit the entire 
international community: in this way the de-
veloped countries would avoid increasing their 
balance-of-payments deficits, the developing 
countries would benefit from a rare resource 
which would otherwise be wasted, and the 
37See United Nations, The World Market for Iron Ore, 
ST/ECE/Steel/24, pp. 90 and 91. 
38See UNCTAD, Consideration of International 
Measures on Meat, Element of an International Ar-
rangement on Beef and Veal, Report of the UNCTAD 
secretariat, TD/B/IPC/Meat/2, Geneva, January 1978, p. 
14. 
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transnational corporations would increase their 
profits. 
Relocation is much less beneficial for de-
veloping countries when the reason for moving 
is pollution. In most developed countries, 
governments have established regulations 
against pollution, which mean an increase in 
production costs of the enterprises affected, 
and the transfer of polluting industries to de-
veloping countries where no such regulations 
exist is a substantial comparative advantage in 
these circumstances. From 2% to 3% of the total 
sales of enterprises producing non-ferrous 
metals, iron and steel and foodstuffs are used to 
cover the costs of the fight against pollution in. 
the developed countries. In the period 1973-
1979, 6% of investments in the industrial sector 
were aimed at combating pollution.39 
Enterprises which produce in developing 
countries, however, avoid such expenditures at 
t he expense of polluting the environment of 
these countries. 
Finally, the fiscal advantages granted by 
almost all developing countries are a major at-
traction for transnational corporations, espe-
cially in comparison with the high taxes they 
must pay in the developed countries for the 
same activities or on their overall profits. 
(c) Some policy conclusions 
The results of quantitative analysis show 
that the significant wage differences between 
developing and developed countries are not 
matched by analogous differences in produc-
tivity. Whatever method is used, the results are 
the same: the wage costs of a transnational 
corporation are from 60% to 80% lower in the 
ent i re industrial manufacturing sector of the 
developing countries in question than in the 
Uni ted States (see tables 13 and 14). Explana-
tion of the reasons for this is beyond the capa-
bilities and intentions of this article. We will 
merely make a brief reference to what is signif-
icant in the field of economic policy. 
Wage levels vary from one country to 
3yThis percentage was 22% for non-ferrous metals, 
17% for primary metals, 14% for steel and 16% for paper 
(see U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, June 1978). 
another depending on the capital available per 
active person for the country as a whole40 and 
on the power of negotiation of unionized work-
ers in the income distribution struggle. In the 
developing countries, where average produc-
tivity and wages are low, if an industry is in-
troduced which has greater productivity, the 
wages distributed will be in line, sometimes 
with a slight rise, with the national average and 
will be lower than the growth of productivity in 
this industry. Thus, in different countries there 
may be large differences in wages between 
workers who produce similar goods and even 
be tween those on an identical production line. 
O n e of the results of this seems to be the ten-
dency to lower the highest wages in the devel-
oped countries without at the same time in-
creasing the lowest ones in the developing 
countries. This may happen because in devel-
oped countries access to cheaper products from 
developing countries may lead to the closing 
down of industries which are labour intensive 
and therefore not competitive, with resultant 
unemployment and weakening of the workers' 
power of negotiation. At the same time, in the 
developing countries, the higher export prices 
obtained from manufactured products (or the 
greater volume exported) do not have a direct 
impact on the general wage level. Besides, in 
the case of the transnational corporations in the 
developing countries which produce for 
export, there is no correspondence between 
labour costs and the purchasing power of the 
consumers of the goods produced, since these 
consumers are foreigners.41 
In short, we have demonstrated that in the 
cases considered there is a big difference in 
wages so that the transnational corporations are 
extracting surpluses from the low wages paid in 
underdeveloped countries. The solution to the 
problem cannot be the simplistic one of in-
creasing wages, with no relation to average 
national levels. This option would not be 
feasible, and even if it were, the establishment 
of enclaves of high wages would not benefit the 
developing country. The advisable policy 
40See Celso Furtado, Prefacio a nova economía políti-
ca, Paz e Terra, Rio de Janeiro, 1976, p. 119. 
^Ibid., p. 187. 
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would be to divert this surplus towards ex- the comparative advantages allowing access to 
penditures related to national development, by the international market were not lost, but were 
means of government appropriation42 either reduced to a minimum: in other words, the 
through export taxes43 or direct State export; prices would be the highest that international 
this would have to be done in such a way that competition would allow. 
IV 
Policy alternatives 
In the preceding sections we considered the 
types of industrialization in developing coun-
tries and the policy of industrial redeployment 
of the developed countries. It is now time to 
analyse possible and desirable policies for 
meeting the needs of the Latin American coun-
tries and the realities of the international econ-
omy. We shall refer to 'open' industrialization 
based on comparative advantages which is 
compatible with the policies of the developed 
countries, and 'autonomous-and popular' in-
dustrialization, which we believe to be suitable 
to the requirements of the developing coun-
tries. In each case, these are not exclusive 
models but predominant ones: in the case of 
the predominance of open industrialization 
there will also be, complementarily, a certain 
amount of autonomous and popular subordi-
nate industrialization, and vice versa. 
4 2
" T h e heart of the matter is that the opposing claims of 
the labour force and of the owners-entrepreneurs must be 
harmonized with the social appropriation and use of some 
of the value created: a process which in all known capitalist 
and socialist systems takes place through the State (all the 
more so, obviously, in the case of State-owned or controlled 
entreprises) ." Aníbal Pinto, "The opening-up of Latin 
America to the exterior", CEPAL Review, Santiago, Chile, 
No. 11, August 1980, p . 51. 
•*3"Even a substantial increase in the price of this la-
bour (measured in terms of what it produces for the interna-
tional market) will not prevent it from still being cheap for 
transnationals which have access to the markets of the cen-
tral countries, where wage rates for the same work are 
presently from 5 to 10 times higher. The countries with 
cheaper labour could introduce a tax on the export of manu-
factures in order to cover, totally or partially, the difference 
be tween their wage rates and those of other peripheral 
countries competing on the same markets. It would not be 
surprising if the periphery moved towards a co-ordinated 
fiscal policy for the purpose of retaining a part of the surplus 
which the transnationals derive from exploiting cheap la-
bour." Celso Furtado, Criatividade e dependencia na civi-
lizaçâo industrial, Paz eTerm,Rio de Janeiro, 1978,p. 122. 
1. 'Open industrialization based on 
comparative advantages 
(a) General characteristics 
'Open' industrialization based on com-
parative adantages has recently been proposed 
as a desirable model for developing countries. 
The premise is that each country should pro-
duce the goods with which it can compete in-
ternationally, whether in mining, agriculture or 
industry. The industrial sector is not assigned 
any leadership role in development; rather, 
this role is taken by 'competitive' activities or 
those outside the international market (con-
struction, commerce, financial services, 
tourism, etc.). The financial intermediation 
sector, which transfers resources between the 
productive sectors and links the internal 
market with the international one, has a 
prominent place in all this.44 The comparative 
advantages here are the lower costs of natural 
resources and labour. That is, these advantages 
are based on the exploitation of resources 
which in many cases are not renewable and on 
the low standard of living of the population; in 
other words these are advantages that the de-
veloped countries can extract from underde-
velopment. 
In support of this model, the example of 
Japan is cited, although in our opinion it serves 
precisely to support the opposite case. 
In Japan, industrialization was based on 
sectors which do not appear to have compar-
4 4 See Fernando Fajnzylber, Dinámica industrial en 
las economías avanzadas y en los países semindustriali-
zados, Mexico City, June 1980, p. 76 (mimeo). 
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY/A.£. Calcagno and).M. Jakobowicz 25 
ative advantages. "The Ministry of Internation-
al Trade and Industry (MITI) decided to estab-
lish industries in Japan which would require 
the intensive use of capital and technology: 
industries which, considering the comparative 
costs of production, would be extremely inap-
propriate for Japan —steel, oil refining, petro-
chemicals, automobiles, aeronautics, industrial 
machinery of all kinds, and electronics, in-
cluding electronic computers. From a static 
and short-term point of view, the encourage-
ment of such industries would seem to be in 
conflict with economic rationality. But taking a 
more long-term view, these are precisely the 
industries in which income demand elasticity 
is greatest, technological progress most rapid, 
and labour productivity rises fastest. It was 
clear that without these industries —solely 
with light industry— it would be difficult to 
employ a population of 100 million and raise its 
standard of living to equal that of Europe and 
the United States; one way or another, Japan 
must have a chemical industry and heavy 
industry".45 
At the same time, Japan closed its doors to 
foreign capital, established a powerful cor-
porate base linked to the State and, on the basis 
of its protected internal market, broke into the 
international markets. This is an example of 
protection and specialization in activities 
which are most advantageous for economic 
development and national independence, in 
line with the views of the ruling political and 
managerial groups. 
fb) The newly industrializing countries 
The case of the newly industrializing 
countries is cited as an example of 'open in-
dustrialization'. To analyse it, we must distin-
guish at least two different points: first, the 
heterogeneity of these countries, and second 
the fact that in some of them the essential 
features attributed to this type of industrializa-
tion are of secondary importance in their 
overall development process. 
4SStatement by Vice-Minister of Industry Ojimi, cited 
by Fernando Fajnzylber, o¡). cit., pp. 54 and 55. 
In the first place, there is not just one 
single type of'newly industrializing countries'. 
There are basic differences, for example, be-
tween Brazil and Mexico, Singapore and Hong 
Kong, and South Korea and Taiwan, to give 
three examples. Table 15 shows some of these 
differences, not only as regards size —in some 
cases these countries are very large nations and 
in others, city-States— but also as regards 
economic structure. 
This type of industrialization has been 
described as having two characteristic features: 
a growth policy oriented towards the exterior 
and greater exploitation of comparative ad-
vantages. However, the fulfilling of these two 
requirements depends on the particular cir-
cumstances of each country —especially its 
size, supply of natural resources and existence 
of an internal market— rather than on the ap-
plication of a specific theoretical model; thus, 
these conditions fully exist in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, but they apply only to a certain ex-
tent in South Korea, and they are lacking in 
Brazil and Mexico. It is obvious thatcity-States, 
without natural resources and with a very small 
internal market, have no other alternative but 
the external market, for which purpose they 
must exploit their comparative advantages. In 
the case of Singapore, one of the advantages, is 
its geographical location, which facilitated the 
installation of large oil refineries, while in that 
of Hong Kong, the advantages are the proximity 
to China, cheap labour and the international 
communications network. 
The case of Korea is similar to the Japanese 
example: an autonomous development model, 
with little foreign capital and with speciali-
zation arising from a policy structured by the 
government and national management. Thus, 
in 1975 exports amounted to 13,5% of the gross 
national product, and 74.6% of them consisted 
of manufactures, but only 21.0% of total pro-
duction of manufactures was exported. In the 
same year the production of goods and services 
was 1.8 times greater than in 1970 and 1.2 times 
that of 1973 at constant prices. "This expansion 
of production was primarily achieved by the 
rapid growth in the manufacturing sector, led 
by heavy industry and chemicals, which re-
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Table 15 





Population Per capita 
(millions of GNP 
inhabitants (1976 
in 1976) dollars) 
110.0 1 140 
62.0 1090 
36.0 670 






















































Source: OECD, L'incidence..., op. cit., Paris, 1979; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development 




quire more intermediate goods than other 
industries".46 
The situation in Brazil and Mexico is dif-
ferent, since the export coefficient in relation to 
the product is lower than 9%, and less than 5% of 
manufactured production is exported. These 
are typical examples of industrialization by 
import substitution, with the complementary 
export of a minor part of industrial production. 
In the case of Mexico, the border activity spe-
cifically devoted to international subcon-
tracting —'maquila'— amounts to only 2.3% of 
national industrial production. 
In these cases, we can see that interna-
tional subcontracting based on cheap labour is 
only one element in the industrial activity of 
these 'newly industrializing countries' and that 
only in the city-States —which lack natural re-
sources and an internal market— is it the most 
important element. 
(c) Some effects of predomination of the 'open 
export-oriented model 
A general assessment shows the advisabil-
ity of this type of industrialization in countries 
with a small internal market and scarce natural 
resources where there is no other alternative: 
but it cannot serve as a model for countries with 
46See Keuch Soo Kim, "Interindustry Analysis of the 
Korean Economy in 1975", in Bank of Korea, Quarterly 
Economic Review, March 1978, p. 23. 
other possibilities, where it would take only 
minor, complementary forms. In principle, the 
firms which practice this model may be more 
closely tied to the economy of the developed 
country than to the rest of the economy of 
the developing country, since they are usually 
linked in the production chain of transnational 
corporations. In many cases they are enclaves, 
importing raw material or parts, incorporating 
cheap labour and re-exporting these same ele-
ments in a more processed form, all under the 
control of the transnational corporation. 
From the economic point of view, this a 
very unstable activity, since it implies very low 
investment of fixed capital and, if labour or 
fiscal problems arise, it is easy and not very 
costly to move these activities to another more 
favourable country. It is estimated that the 
average amount of fixed capital needed for each 
unit of work in the export processing zone of 
Kaohsiung (Taiwan) is about US$ 1 500, while 
in Mexico, en 1974, the average for subcon-
tracting firms was US$ 840 per worker em-
ployed.47 To appreciate the insignificance of 
47See Constatine V. Vaitsos, Employment Problems 
and Transnational Enterprises in Developing Countries: 
Distortions and Inequality, ILO, World Employment Pro-
gramme, Geneva, 1976. The figures cited in Vaitsos' work 
are taken from the Asian Development Bank, South East 
Asia's Economy in the 1970s, Longman, 1971, pp. 306 et 
seq., and refer to Taiwan. For Mexico, see Víctor Manuel 
Bernai Sahagún, El impacto de las empresas multinaciona-
les en el empleo y los ingresos: el caso de México, ILO, 
World Employment Programme, Geneva, 1976. 
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these figures, we may compare them with the 
US$ 31 000 in capital invested per manual and 
non-manual worker on average in manufac-
tur ing in the United States. An extreme ex-
ample of this system, which correctly illus-
trates its nature, is the notice which appeared 
in the international press early in 1979, an-
nouncing the construction in Japan of a floating 
factory which would anchor where labour was 
cheapest , with the intention of setting sail 
again when it learned of another more favour-
able location. 
Another serious problem affecting these 
activities is that they depend entirely on the 
access they have to the markets of the devel-
oped countries. A resurgence of protectionist 
policies would eliminate this type of industry 
and that might very well happen, given the 
unemployment situation in the developed 
countries, although in the OECD study cited it 
was considered improbable, since it would 
provoke a reduction in imports by the 'newly 
industrializing countries' and would also pre-
vent them from paying their foreign debt ser-
vice, both of which situations would be harmful 
to the developed countries.4" 
From another point of view, it does not 
seem right to consider very low wages as a 
comparative advantage to be exploited, rather 
than as a defect of underdevelopment which 
should be eliminated. Giving the title of 'in-
dustrialized country' to a nation where the type 
of activity just described predominates (which 
is more akin to the sale of cheap labour.than to 
industrial production) would be like calling a 
country which has no oil but refines it an 'oil 
producer ' , or using the term 'maritime country' 
to describe one which has no national fleet but 
grants a flag of convenience. 
On the political level, the maintenance of 
low wages and poor working conditions (long 
working hours, little protection against acci-
dents , no social security, etc.), implies that 
there are no trade unions and that there is an 
authoritarian government, or that there is ex-
ploitation oí foreign immigrants willing to work 
unde r the worst conditions. 
4»See O E C D , op. cit., pp . 18 and 19. 
2. Autonomous and popular industrialization 
(a) Capital goods 
In underdeveloped countries, industrial-
ization is the basic aspect of their economic 
development . It is not a question of using it as a 
source of external resources —the balance of 
payments is generally unfavourable— but of 
increasing the productive capacity of the coun-
try, creating external economies, training the 
labour force and applying technologies which 
will increase productivity. This is an indis-
pensable requirement in order for the country 
to have the physical possibility of being auton-
omous. In this type of industrialization, the 
capital goods industry is essential,49 since it is 
the foundation of the industrial structure, of the 
conditions under which capital is accumulated, 
and of the international competitivity of the 
developed countries, but it is still weak in the 
underdeveloped countries. In particular, the 
capital goods industry is the basis for the accu-
mulation of capital and the principal vehicle of 
technical progress, which in turn has a direct 
impact on labour productivity and investment. 
Likewise, it sustains autonomous industrial 
development , since it generates the equipment 
necessary to install other sectors of produc-
tion.50 In addition, it requires a substantially 
4 y The capital goods sector may be divided into three 
parts: "(1) the section for producing producer goods 
(machine tools, the corresponding automation equipment, 
and data processing systems in the broad sense); (2) the 
section which produces intermediate goods, heavy ma-
chinery, heavy electrical equipment, control and moni-
toring apparatus, miscellaneous general equipment 
(pumps, compressors, valves), and electrical equipment, 
and (3) the section producing plant for the manufacture 
of consumer goods (textile machinery, plastic processing 
machines, machines for agriculture and the food industry, 
various kinds of electrical equipment)". (See France, Min-
istry of Industry and Research, La division internationale 
du travail, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1976, vol, I, 
p . 105.) 
^Na t iona l control of the development of the engineer-
ing industries —a goal which has absolute priority, both 
from the point of view of the imperative need for national 
independence and from that of maintaining dominance 
over the 'peripheral countries' (understood from the per-
spective of the developed countries)— is dependent on 
mastery of these technologies and the development of the 
necessary innovations (see France, Commissariat General 
du Plan, La specialisation internationale des industries à 
l'horizon 1985, Paris, La Documentation Française, 1978, 
p . 239.) 
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lower capital intensity than that of the average 
for manufacturing industry. In the cases of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom —which differ substantially in the 
age of their capital equipment— if the average 
for manufacturing industry is taken as being 
equal to 100, the relationship between the 
stock of capital and the cost of labour is 54, 72 
and 77 for metal products, non-electrical and 
electrical machinery in Germany, while in the 
United Kingdom this ratio was 60 for instru-
ments, mechanical and electrical equipment.51 
At the same time, the wages paid in these in-
dustries are higher than the average: 106 in 
non-electrical machinery, 121 in transport 
equipment and 115 in electrical machinery.52 
The proportion of research in the same coun-
tries and branches was 385, 108 and 94. 
In 1968-1970, employment in these branches 
came to 38.5% of total employment in 
manufacturing.53 
In the international trade in capital goods, 
87.5% of world exports originated in capitalist 
developed countries, 10% in socialist countries 
and only 2.5% in developing countries in 1977. 
If we consider the external trade balance, be-
tween 1969 and 1976 the capitalist developed 
countries dropped from a surplus of 1.3 billion 
dollars to a deficit of 27.1 billion dollars on total 
goods, but in the capital goods sector the sur-
plus rose during this period from 16.8 to 77.3 
billion dollars. Thus we can rightly say that 
"the capital goods sector is the central nucleus 
of the competitivity of the advanced industrial 
economies with respect to the rest of the world, 
and this situation is proved by Europe, the 
United States and Japan".54 
It is clear from the above that the devel-
oping countries must advance in this branch of 
industry as an indispensable requirement for 
5 1 See United Nations, Secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Europe, Structure and Change in Euro-
pean Industry, New York, 1977, p. 44. 
5 2This refers to the weighted average for Belgium, 
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, with the total for manufacturing equalling 100. 
See Structure and Change..., op. cit., p . 66. 
^Ibid., p. 104. 
^ S e e Fernando Fajnzylber, Dinámica industrial..., 
op. cit. 
improving their whole productive system and 
strengthening their national autonomy. More-
over, generally speaking the investment re-
quirements are not high, the technology is 
well-known and the internal market of the de-
veloping countries is potentially very large. 
Imports of capital goods by the developing 
countries, which might —under the right set 
of circumstances— be largely replaced, 
amounted to 93.2 billion dollars in 1977; the 
first move should be to change the policy of 
these countries, which at present favour the 
import of capital goods. In addition, special-
ization could take place which might lead to the 
establishment of extensive trade in parts and 
components within these sectors among under-
developed countries. 
(b) Mass-consumption 
The other industrial sector which should 
have priority, along with that of production of 
capital goods, is the sector related to the supply 
of popular consumer goods. Here, the benefi-
ciary of the development process is the general 
population, so that when selecting the types of 
goods to be produced, priority should be given 
to those needed by the majority, who in the 
underdeveloped countries have low and me-
dium incomes. A similar strategy has been ad-
vocated recently by some international organi-
zations. Thus, the 'endogenous' industrial-
ization strategy proposed by UNIDO for the 
developing countries is aimed at satisfying the 
needs of the general population and involves 
the adjustment of industrial production to the 
manufacture of the products needed for this 
purpose. The impulse for this model would 
arise within the country itself and its purpose 
would be to satisfy the basic needs for food, 
clothing, housing, medical services, education 
and transport. It would be a 'low-key' type of 
industrialization aimed at meeting the basic 
requirements with a low capital/labour ratio, 
taking maximum advantage of local resources 
and the action of small and medium-sized 
enterprises.55 
5 5See Héctor Soza, "The industrialization debate in 
Latin America", herein. 
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This strategy has received the support of 
representatives of developed countries as a 
means of cutting back even more on scarce in-
ternational aid; but they forget to point out that 
this type of industry must form part of a general 
process of industrialization based on the capital 
(a) Industrial ' redeployment' is more a sub-
ject of discussion than a significant reality. Dur-
ing recent years the developed countries have 
further consolidated their position in world ex-
ports of manufactures (82.6% in 1963 and 83.5% 
in 1976). Moreover, they export to the whole 
group of newly industrializing countries more 
than they import from them. 
(b) In the short term, the developed coun-
tries might suffer from a decrease in the num-
ber ofjobs as a result of the transfer of indus-
tries, which would increase current unemploy-
ment ; bu t in the medium term the increase in 
exports to developing countries would more 
than compensate for the loss ofjobs. In the long 
run (from 1985 until at least the year 2000), the 
low growth rate or actual decrease in the active 
population will reduce the growth rate of their 
economies, unless productivity is increased, 
foreign labour is brought in or some labour-
intensive activities are subcontrated outside. 
T h e difficulties involved in the first two solu-
tions may lead to relocation. 
(c) For the transnational corporations, the 
most important comparative advantage is the 
wage differential between developed and de-
veloping countries. Average salaries in indus-
try in the latter countries are 12.5 times lower 
than in the United States; and even if this figure 
is weighted for differences in productivity, we 
may conclude that the transnational corpora-
tion will have to pay only some 20% to 40% of 
the corresponding United States wage costs. 
Moreover, the productivity of branches of 
transnational corporations in developing coun-
tries is normally similar to that of the parent 
companies . 
(d) In the developing countries, indus-
trialization is the basic factor in economic de-
velopment. The capital goods industry, as an 
indispensable element for placing national 
goods industries. In other words, they accept 
an industrialization which is 'popular' from the 
point of view of its beneficiaries, but not one 
which serves as a basis for national economic 
independence . 
autonomy on a solid foundation, forms the basis 
of this process. At the same time, these coun-
tries must give priority to industries which 
produce mass-consumption goods, as comple-
mentary to industrial development but not as 
its main focus. 
(e) There is not a mutual exclusiveness 
but rather a complementarity between indus-
trial production for the internal market and for 
export. The basic market is the internal one, but 
exports of manufactures are a strong support 
because they bring in foreign currency and, in 
some cases, because they enable a country to 
reach the necessary scale of production. The 
relative importance of the external market 
increases in small countries. 
(f) The 'open' industrialization model 
based on present comparative advantages tries 
to promote the low cost of labour and natural 
resources (often non-renewable), does not con-
tr ibute to consolidating national autonomy or 
providing the people with goods, and may lead 
to the veritable cultivation of underdevelop-
ment . It may be a solution for countries with 
scarce natural resources and a tight internal 
market, or it may aid development in a more 
complex system of industrialization, but it 
cannot in itself be a model for developing 
countries. 
(g) The type of development attributed to 
the newly industrializing countries cannot be 
presented as a model for all developing coun-
tries, due to their heterogeneity and because 
the features attributed to this model —external 
openness and industrialization based on com-
parative advantages— are actually either non-
existent or of secondary importance in most of 
these countries (Japan and South Korea, which 
are the most successful examples, did not at the 
beginning have comparative advantages in the 
activities which are at the basis of their in-
Some conclusions 
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dustrial development and are not open to the and low wages is very difficult to maintain 
exterior, while as for Brazil and Mexico, they without strong political authoritarianism, the 
export less than 5% of their production of suppression or control of labour unions, or the 
manufactures). exploitation of foreign workers. 
(h) A model based on 'labour discipline' 
Appendix 
Table A 
COMPARATIVE STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIALIZED 
COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO SKILLED LABOUR AND 
CAPITAL CONTENT 
(As percentage of imports of all manufactured products) 
Skilled labour content: H 





Capital content: P 
P very low 
P l o w 
P medium 
P h i g h 
TOTAL 
Combination of the two criteria: 
(1) H and P h i g h 
(2) H high, P low or medium 
(3) H medium, P high 
(4) H medium, P low or medium 
(5) H low or very low, P high 
(6) H low, P low or medium 
(7) H very low, P low or medium 






































































Source: Commission of the European Communities, Evolution des structures sectorielles, op. cit., p. 41. 
"Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, .Singapore, Korea, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile. 
bUSSR, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic. 
cOECD countries except Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITYIA.Ë. Calcagno andJ.M. Jakobowicz 31 
Table B 
PRODUCTIVITY, NOMINAL WAGES AND WAGE COSTS PER UNIT PRODUCED 
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 

















Source: United Nations, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1975, New York, 1977; International Labour 
Organisation, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva, 1977; United Nations, Monthly Bulletin 
of Statistics; Commodities Research Unit Ltd., Study on the degree and scope for increased 
processing of primary commodities in developing countries, prepared for UNCTAD, New York, 
September 1975. 
Table C 
AVERAGE WAGE PER EMPLOYEE 
(Manufacturing = 100) 
Developing countries" 
Developed countries" 
































Source: United Nations, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1975, New York, 1977; International Labour 
Organization, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1977; Geneva, 1978; United Nations, Monthly 
Bulletin of Statistics, New York. 
'These countries are listed in footnote 26. 
Table D 
DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, AND LABOUR 
EMPLOYED IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE 















































Source: Same as for table C. 
a
 These countries are listed in footnote 26. 
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Table E 




































Source: Same as for table C. 
•'These countries are listed in footnote 26, 
Table F 
WAGES IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 
BY BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY il 
(United States = 100) 
Iron and Non-ferrous Total 
Textiles steel metals Metallurgy manufac-
tures 



















Source; Same as table C, plus I,B. Kravis, Z. Kennessey et al., A Systetn of International Comparisons of 
Gross Product and Purchasing, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
•'For method used, see footnote 29. 
''For the list oí countries, see footnote 26. 
Table G 
COMPARISON OF WAGE COSTS PER UNIT PRODUCED1 




Iron and Non-ferrous 



















Source: Same as table C. 
"The method of determination of productivity used is that described in the ILO study cited in footnote 31. 
''For the list of countries, see footnote 26, 
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Table H 
COMPARISON O F WAGE COSTS PER UNIT PRODUCED 





Iron and Non-ferrous 
























Source: Same as table C. 
"For the list of countries, see footnote 26. 
